Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 27
Issue 1 June 2000

Article 8

2000

Accounting history and the emperor's new clothes: A response to
Knowing more as knowing less?...
Thomas N. Tyson

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Tyson, Thomas N. (2000) "Accounting history and the emperor's new clothes: A response to Knowing
more as knowing less?...," Accounting Historians Journal: Vol. 27 : Iss. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Tyson: Accounting history and the emperor's new clothes: A response to Knowing more as knowing less?.
Tyson: The Emperor’s New Clothes
Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 27, No. 1
June 2000

159

Thomas N. Tyson
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ACCOUNTING HISTORY AND THE
EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES:
A RESPONSE TO “KNOWING MORE
AS KNOWING LESS? . . . ”
Abstract: Hoskin and Macve (H&M) continue to accredit certain
events in the early 1840s as enabling the creation of norm-based
accounting and its use to control labor and improve productivity at
the Springfield Armory (SA). Although critics have refuted H&M’s
interpretation of these events and reproached their use of inflated
language, H&M maintain their unique perspective with undiminished fervor. This rejoinder further questions the validity of H&M’s
perspective of U.S. accounting history. It identifies the many conventional business historians who refute it and emphasizes that no
other evidence has been presented to indicate that norm-based accounting was ever employed in the U.S. before the early 1900s. It
also describes how H&M have tried to bolster their position by citing several contemporary and more critical scholars who in fact
refute it. More substantively, the paper emphasizes that the core
debate between H&M and their critics is not simply over the timing
of particular events at SA. Rather, it centers on the nature of historical evidence and the distinction between history and historicism.

INTRODUCTION
Hoskin and Macve (H&M) continue to argue that certain
events at the Springfield Armory (SA) have been largely unrecognized for marking the first use of accounting to control labor
and improve productivity in the U.S. Their core belief, unchanged from earlier papers [H&M, 1988, 1996], is that the
confluence of performance norms and managerial discipline
first occurred in 1841 at SA and transformed accounting’s role
from mercantilism to “managerialism.” In their latest paper,
H&M seek to rebut critics of this uniquely Foucaldian perspective of U.S. accounting history.
In previous papers, I have argued that H&M distorted the
historical record [Tyson, 1993] and refuted their contentions
that 1) norm-based accounting effectuated SA’s subsequent productivity increases [Tyson, 1990], and that 2) accounting inforPublished by eGrove, 2000
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mation was not used for decision-making purposes before the
early 1840s [Tyson, 1992, 1998]. Although H&M, in a previous
draft, acknowledged that “the historical evidence does indeed
illustrate a growing array of sophisticated cost and management accounting practices being developed in the early 19th
century,” they still misrepresent the historical record and insist
that events at SA were transforming.1
In the present rejoinder, I discuss the more substantive
issue underlying the debate between the Foucaldian and economic rationalist perspectives of accounting history—the nature and role of historical evidence. The main point of this
rebuttal is that no evidence can sustain H&M’s theory that accounting was used to discipline labor in the U.S. in the early
1840s. In actuality, norm-based accounting was first employed
in the early 1900s when standard costing and other scientific
management principles became socially acceptable. Owner/
managers controlled labor and other costs of production at SA
and other 19th century establishments by increasing mechanization, utilizing economies of scale, and/or reducing piecework
wage rates. Even if owner/managers had wanted to identify star
performers and use their methods and productivity as the
benchmark for other laborers to emulate, the economic, social,
and political climate of the mid-19th century work place precluded the use of accounting for labor control purposes. Skilled
labor shortages, the use of internal contracting, and cost-benefit criteria are among the most important factors that explain
the absence of norm-based accounting.2
The balance of this rejoinder is organized as follows. The
next section describes the key role evidence plays in developing
and sustaining theory and identifies the scholars who refute
H&M’s position on the timing of norm-based accounting. The
paper then provides a brief overview of the U.S. industrial work
1
H&M continue to inflate language regarding both Daniel Tyler’s timestudy procedure and their critics’ remarks. For example, they substitute the
word “ought” for the word “could,” which Tyler used in the description of his
own work [Tyler, 1883]. Clearly, the word “ought” has a normative component
whereas none existed in the original record. H&M (p. 115) also bend language
when they write that Boyns and Edwards [1996] “themselves accept the conclusions of our work on the link between West Point and Springfield.” Boyns
and Edwards [1996, p. 42] actually wrote that they accepted the “analysis of
the links,” but that “we are not convinced that it is sufficient, in terms of their
[H&M’s] disciplinary thesis . . . ”
2
See Boyns and Edwards [1996] and Tyson [1990] for a fuller discussion of
these factors in the U.K. and U.S., respectively.
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place of the 19th century and explains why human accountability in the form of norm-based accounting was not employed.
The concluding section addresses the distinction between history and historicism and explains why H&M’s perspective of
U.S. accounting history is so untenable.
THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
Evidence is a concept central to the empirical sciences.
Whether to believe, or even take seriously, a scientific
hypothesis or theory depends on the quantity and character of the evidence in its favour [Achinstein, 1983, p.
1].
As Achinstein indicated, and most other historians concur,
evidence plays a central role in evaluating new theories and
testing unproven hypotheses. Although empirical tests cannot
be performed to evaluate theories about the past, interpretations that seek to countervail conventional paradigms, like economic rationalism, must utilize historical evidence to gain
broader acceptance. Radical antipositivists might argue that
evidence in the form of archival records is inherently unable to
explain the past because of its subjectivity. H&M (p. 97, fn. 7)
appear to ascribe to this view when they write that:
We therefore find profoundly problematic any theory
that takes as its objects of analysis the subject as rational, the organization as structure, and information
as objective.
Clearly, archival evidence in the form of documents, letters,
memoranda, etc. must be evaluated carefully since it could contain major factual errors or omissions, either by accident or by
intent. Furthermore, important countervailing evidence might
be unexamined, leading the researcher to form inappropriate
conclusions. Particular evidence might also be so clearly biased
or unreliable that the researcher must reject it out-of-hand. Historians acknowledge these caveats about evidence, but they do
not reject its crucial role in developing and assessing theory. If
all evidence were perceived as inherently biased and unreliable,
then scholarly historical research would have no purpose or
essence. Ginsburg [1991, p. 83] described how the rejection of
evidence threatens history:
Instead of dealing with evidence as an open window,
contemporary skeptics regard it as a wall, which by
definition precludes any access to reality. This extreme
Published by eGrove, 2000
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anti-positivistic attitude, which considers all referential
assumptions as a theoretical naivete, turns out to be a
sort of inverted positivism.
In the midst of the ten-year debate about particular events
at SA, it was gratifying to see that H&M [1996] called for evidence that would support interpretations of U.S. accounting
history that differ from their own. Tyson [1998] responded to
the challenge by enumerating many specific points that refuted
H&M’s perspective. H&M now disregard many of these remarks
as they maintain their perspective with vigor, although independent scholars have yet to provide a single example of
“human accountability” at other 19th century locales. H&M
(p. 100) still call for additional evidence but in a significantly
different form. They now place their unique perspective on the
same plateau as widely accepted, conventional paradigms:
Our thesis remains as subject to falsification by evidence yet to come as any other. An accumulation of
such evidence therefore remains essential in order to
enable us to piece together more of the jigsaw of our
theoretical understanding of how such developments
occurred.
H&M’s latest invitation begs the question as to the type of
new evidence that could refute a theory of human accountability, managerialism, and norm-based accounting at SA. It is not
as if SA operated in a vacuum and its activities were unknown
to outsiders. Deyrup [1970] described how arms-making techniques and cost figures were routinely shared with private armorers in the early 1800s. Hindle and Lubar [1986] noted that
SA inspectors held key positions at the Waltham Watch Company (WWC) and were hired for their ability to enforce work
discipline. Surely, if norm-based accounting had produced the
large productivity gains at SA that H&M claim, WWC and other
large factories would have implemented norm-based accounting to achieve similar results.
It is also worth noting that the terminology “standard(s),”
“norm(s),” or “accountability” never appeared in the SA or
WWC archives or in any pre-1890 documents that have come to
light. In actuality, these and comparable terms were first used
in conjunction with the scientific management movement that
began over 50 years after certain transforming events were
“discovered” at SA. The absence of any confirming evidence
surely refutes a theory that is based entirely on the interpretations one set of authors attribute to productivity data that can
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss1/8
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be explained by a variety of factors other than norm-based accounting.3 Clearly, the burden of proof in the form of confirming evidence rests with those proposing a new paradigm rather
than those rejecting it in favor of established views.
At present, evidence and expert opinion that refute H&M’s
theory, impact, and time dating of human accountability at SA
are both compelling and overwhelming. Renowned business
historians [Chandler, 1977; Hounshell, 1984; Nelson, 1991] consistently have dated the first appearance of norm-based accounting in the U.S. to the early 1900s. Others [Faler, 1974;
Nelson, 1981; Prude, 1983; Rosenberg, 1969] have explained
why labor shortages and the lack of an industrial work ethic
precluded owner/managers from employing accounting norms
to control labor costs. Regular attendance, conscientious performance, and general sobriety were still problematic in the
mid-late 19th century at SA and other factories. Achieving these
attributes was a necessary prerequisite to the use of accounting
norms. Furthermore, historians who discussed SA activities in
summary [Benet, 1878] and in detail [Deyrup, 1970; Smith,
1977] attributed no special significance to Daniel Tyler’s 1832
rate-setting activities that H&M embellish.
Perhaps most damaging to H&M’s perspective are the
views of contemporary and critical accounting scholars, even
though H&M strongly intimate that these scholars support
them. For example, H&M (p. 112) cite Miller [1992] to bolster
their remarks that, “a leading characteristic of modernity, certainly by the end of the 19th century, is the creation of ‘calculable
persons in calculable spaces.’” However, Miller [1992, p. 65]
wrote that, “Managerial or cost accounting as addressed here is
a twentieth century phenomenon that has had a relatively distinct trajectory in comparison to financial reporting.” Miller
[1992, p. 70] also stated that,
An early and decisive moment in the invention of the
calculating self is the reformulation of cost accountancy in the factory between 1900 and 1930 . . . The notion of standard costs, entailing the calculation of predetermined ‘normal’ costs against which actual costs
can be compared, was at the heart of this transformation. (emphasis added)

3
See Tyson [1990] for a detailed discussion of rationales that explain post1841 labor productivity improvements at SA.
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H&M also reference Miller and O’Leary (M&O) [1987] to
support their view that human accountability first appeared at
SA in the 19th century.4 A careful examination of M&O [1987]
failed to uncover any statement indicating that “calculable persons” were “created” in the 19th century. In point of fact, M&O
[1987, pp. 239-240] unequivocally dated the first appearance of
norm-based accounting to the 20th century:5
Accounting is, we argue, an important aspect of this
development of a range of calculative programmes and
techniques which come to regulate the lives of individuals at work in the early twentieth century…It is our
contention that one can understand the emergence of
standard costing and budgeting in the early years of the
twentieth century by situating it within this more general shift in the form of social life which occurs around
the turn of the century. (emphasis added)
M&O cited several noted accounting authors (Dickinson,
Garcke and Fells, Harrison) who had discussed why standard
costs were needed to improve efficiency. They cited these authors to support the conventional view that human accountability was an innovation that first appeared in the U.S. during the
early 20th century [M&O, 1987, p. 242]:
For our concerns in this paper there is one crucial dimension to this innovation. The principle of standard
costs made it possible to attach to every individual
within the firm norms and standards of behaviour.
(emphasis added)
H&M might respond that M&O were not apprised of their
“discovery” at SA before submitting their seminal 1987 article
for publication. However, Miller [1992] and Miller and Napier

4
Specifically, H&M (p. 108) write that, “our distinctive emphasis has been
on the constitutive role of accounting practices and discourse in the widespread 19th century development of the new kind of human performance
measurement which created ‘calculable persons’ within mass populations.”
(emphasis added)
5
Aitken [1985, p. 12] provided the conventional view, which M&O [1987]
clearly supported, of the conjoining of norm-based accounting with scientific
management in his description of Frederick Taylor’s work: “The introduction
of the Taylor system of management at Watertown Arsenal was not merely a
technical innovation. It was also a highly complex social change, upsetting
established roles and familiar patterns of behavior, establishing new systems
of authority and control, and creating new sources of insecurity, anxiety, and
resentment.”
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[1993] were surely aware of H&M’s perspective by the time
these later articles were published, and they could have disassociated norm-based accounting from scientific management. As
the following statement indicates, their thinking had not
changed from the 1987 paper [Miller and Napier, 1993, p. 644]:
Rather, what is important is the alliance formed between standard costing and Taylorism in seeking to
make notions of efficiency operable within the enterprise so that the actions of the individual could be
given a financial visibility and be related to expected
standards and norms.
In summary, H&M’s perspective has been refuted by
prominent business historians who tie norm-based costing to
scientific management in the early 1900s, and by those who fail
to impute the same meaning to the 1832 and 1841 events at SA.
Independent scholars have yet to provide other examples illustrating the use of norm-based accounting in the 19th century at
SA, other federal armories, or private establishments. In essence, the lack of confirming evidence, the absence of other
examples, and the lack of support from other scholars completely isolates H&M’s unique perspective of U.S. accounting
history. The next section provides an overview of industrial
work in the U.S. during the 19th century and indicates why
norm-based accounting was not a 19th century phenomenon.
INDUSTRIAL WORK IN THE 19TH CENTURY
Owner/managers who employed nonfamily employees and
operated in competitive markets have always attempted to control the costs of production. Throughout the 19th century, they
used piecework wages and inside subcontracting to control
labor costs. Piece rates were set either for complete jobs or
specific tasks that both attracted appropriately skilled workers
and generated suitable profits for the contracting agent or
employer. Laurie [1989, p. 64] noted that first-generation U.S.
manufacturers often used the putting-out system whereby work
was done in a laborer’s household rather than a factory. Absent
protective legal statutes or the ability to resist the wage cuts en
masse that strong unions would have afforded, piece-rate reductions often forced household laborers to work 12 to 14-hour
days to earn a decent living wage. As consumer markets increased and transportation networks improved and expanded, it
became more cost effective to conduct work in large, integrated
facilities rather than in craft shops or in domiciles.
Published by eGrove, 2000
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During the pre-Civil War period at SA and other factories,
owner/managers were compelled to automate production in the
face of continual shortages of skilled labor [Licht, 1995].6 Once
automation was more fully achieved, owner/managers could reduce piece rates for factory laborers without experiencing
shortages since less-skilled workers were more abundant and
could do the work that previously required skilled craftsmen. If
owner/managers wanted to improve productivity, either to increase profits or in response to competitors, they did so by
stretching out the workday or speeding up the pace of work.
Hindle and Lubar [1986, p. 198] described how machine pacing
and market effects combined to control labor costs:
The great cost of the machines meant the mills had to
be kept running, even when the market for the product
was weak. That often meant cuts in the workers’ pay.
And most important, the machines’ steady motion insisted on a machine-like pace for the workers. The
managers set the speed of the machines, and the
machines set the pace of work.
Mechanization, specialization, subdivision of labor, and
full integration increasingly characterized large-scale manufacturing facilities over the course of the 19th century. Factories that produced boots, shoes, clothing, and other consumer
goods expanded dramatically, aided in part by technological
advances and the use of steam power. Mass production techniques and interchangeable parts were two key features in the
arms-making, timekeeping device, sewing machine, and similar
industries. Whereas owners of small businesses had been able
to perform most managerial functions themselves, owners in
large factories now had to employ managers and supporting
staff to oversee increasingly complex and costly operations that
included marketing, production, administrative, and purchasing activities. Despite their ability to control costs through
piece-rate cuts, owner/managers also needed a regular factory
work force that was both predictable and disciplined in order to
keep machines running and to generate the output needed to

6
According to Hindle and Lubar [1986, p. 157], both large and small U.S.
businesses favored mechanization. “Mechanization was encouraged by the
economic resources of the United States. Waterpower and later steam power
were cheap and available, and so American business turned to waterwheel and
steam engine to drive machinery. Labor was scarce and thus expensive, and so
machinery was substituted where possible.”
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cover the high fixed costs of capital. Thus, as Hindle and Lubar
[1986] suggested, H&M correctly link the large productivity
gains at both SA and WWC to greater managerial discipline
that West Point training facilitated at both establishments.7
But, in the absence of any supporting evidence, H&M go much
too far when they conjoin norm-based accounting to managerial discipline either at SA, WWC, or any other 19th century
factory.
Fleischman and Tyson [1996] examined the archives of
WWC, a U.S. company that was organized in the early 1850s
and was described by Clawson [1980, p. 78] as, “the first company anywhere in the world to produce watches through extensive use of machinery and interchangeability.” By 1885, WWC
employed 2,400 workers and operated in a highly competitive
market that faced continually falling market prices for watches
over time. Fleischman and Tyson examined WWC’s records and
did find detailed records of individual and total labor costs, but
they found no evidence to suggest that norm-based accounting
was ever employed. Share ownership and inside subcontracting
were the mechanisms used to provide factory discipline, create
incentives, and reduce labor costs. During the economic depression of the 1870s and subsequent deflationary period,
WWC’s subcontracting system was eliminated and former subcontractors were paid far smaller day wages. Thus, in good
times and bad, and in an environment that appeared ideal,
there was no evidence to indicate that accounting norms were
ever contemplated, developed, or used. As H&M now note,
Fleischman and Tyson [1996] found large productivity gains
that were brought about, in part, by improved factory discipline. However, while West Point training enabled WWC superintendents to be more effective disciplinarians, which in conjunction with technological advances and economic forces led
to significant productivity improvements, there is simply no evidence to support a perspective of norm-based accounting that
H&M promote so fervently.

7
For example, Hindle and Lubar [1986, p. 232] accredited West Point
training to tighter discipline at SA, noting that “the system of inspectors was
part of a new, more tightly controlled system of labor at the armories . . . the
managers of the armories introduced new work rules and new management
techniques along with new machines. Time and materials were carefully accounted for; each workman was held responsible for his work.”
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DISCUSSION, SUMMARY, AND CONCLUSIONS
H&M’s unique theory of accounting history has been presented in a series of papers and has drawn equally passionate
rejoinders. To some, the debate may appear to be academic
antler clashing at its worst, with neither side willing to let the
other have the last word on a matter of little interest or importance. Hopefully, readers will recognize that the issues under
debate extend far beyond whether norm-based accounting first
occurred at the SA in the early 1840s or at some later date. The
real issue is the far more substantive one—the use of historical
evidence and the distinction between history and historicism.8
Historians believe in the accumulation of knowledge, the
importance of evidence, and the ability to uncover truths about
the past. Historians also believe that primary source materials
are best able to reveal past events as they transpired. They recognize that there may be more than one interpretation that can
be inferred from the same evidential material and that evidence
must be evaluated carefully. Notwithstanding these caveats, historians form and defend their conclusions on the basis of the
evidence (i.e., documents, reports, letters, memoranda, etc.)
they examine.
Historicists are far more concerned with developing and
sustaining a particular social theory or philosophy of history.9
They are generally less encumbered to ensure the accuracy of
particular events they cite since, to many, historical knowledge
is inherently subjective and no accurate account of the past can
ever be forthcoming. While historians prioritize facts, historicists tend to discount them in the belief that the boundary between fact and fiction is unclear and inconsequential. In the
case of historicists like H&M, their Foucaldian perspective intertwines power and knowledge, discipline and punishment,
and accountability and consequences, all of which are embodied in norm-based accounting.
Although H&M and I continue to dispute particular events,
referents, and semantics, the rhetoric of our debate can be collapsed into several core issues. In 1986, H&M proposed a
unique interpretation of accounting’s potential to marry power

8

See Walsh [1962] for a full discussion of history and historicism.
Burke [1992, p. 3] attributed these perspectives to the different training
that historians and sociologists receive: “Sociologists, for example, are trained
to notice or formulate general rules and often screen out the exceptions. Historians learn to attend to concrete detail at the expense of general patterns.”
9
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and knowledge into a form of human accountability they call
managerialism. In 1988, H&M described the confirmatory evidence they discovered and interpreted as conjoining at SA in
1841 to form accounting norms. They argued that norm-based
accounting was an effective disciplinary device because of the
dramatic productivity improvements that occurred subsequently. H&M have promoted their theory of managerialism
ever since, but neither they nor others have provided a single
example of norm-based accounting at other 19th century locales. Is it unfair to conclude that this new theory is creative
accounting history at best, an intentional delusion at worst, or
more likely the emanation of extremely clever imaginations?10
The historical record is clear – not one independent scholar
has provided evidence that either 1) confirms that events transpired at SA as H&M suggest, 2) provides other examples of
norm-based accounting in the 19th century, or 3) explains why
events that transpired at SA were not duplicated for over 50
years. H&M call for evidence to refute their theory, but a theory
lacking any supporting evidence is simply an untenable hypothesis. In essence, H&M have artfully constructed a new set of
emperor’s clothes, multicolored, beautifully woven, elaborately
crafted and layered. In reality, they remain just an illusion,
except to the emperor that is!
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